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With the growth in distributed information processing systems, security 
of information is a requirement of rapidly growing importance.  
Management of the security infrastructure is one of the most difficult 
aspects of information security provision.  This paper reviews the most 
important aspects of the security management problem, including the 
development of security policies.  The need for security in multi-vendor 
systems makes the security problem more difficult, and is forcing the 
growth of standardised security solutions within the OSI framework.  
Recent developments in the security standardisation field are reviewed. 
 
The main topics (namely management and standards) are covered in sections 
3 and 4 of this paper.  Preliminary to these discussions, in Section 2 a 
brief review of the OSI 7-layer model is given in order to set subsequent 
remarks in context. 
2 THE OSI 7-LAYER MODEL 
 
The aim of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) is to provide a 
standardised means of communication between diverse computer systems.  As 
a basis for the development of OSI standards, ISO have developed a 
Reference Model to partition the problem into discrete layers, and to 
provide a conceptual framework for understanding the complex problems 
involved. 
 
The Reference Model has seven layers; from the 'bottom up' they are as 
follows: 
1.  Physical Layer 
2.  Link Layer 
3.  Network Layer 
4.  Transport Layer 
5.  Session Layer 
6.  Presentation Layer 
7.  Application Layer 
The Reference Model specifies the functionality of each layer and the 
interfaces between adjacent layers.  It also defines methods for 
achieving layer-specific functionality between cooperating computer 
systems. 
 
The lowest three layers (Physical (1), Data Link (2) and Network (3)) are 
concerned with the provision of data transmission.  The Physical Layer 
models the interface of a computer system to the physical medium.  It 
includes such aspects as physical connectors and voltage levels.  The 
Data Link Layer provides a framework around data for transmission by the 
Physical Layer; detection and correction of errors may be performed by 
this layer.  The Network Layer is particularly concerned with routing and 
relaying.  The services offered by the Network Layer to the Transport 
Layer conceal from it the numbers and types of sub-network that may be 
involved in the communication. 
 
The Transport Layer (4) operates end-to-end between computer systems and 
is concerned with Quality of Service.  The Transport Layer is responsible 




The Session Layer (5) assumes reliable data transmission services between 
computer systems (i.e. end-to-end communications).  It occupies the area 
between the application-oriented upper layers (6 and 7) and the 'real-
time' data communication environment.  It provides services for the 
management and control of data flow between two computer systems. 
s 
The function of the Presentation Layer (6) is to provide a common 
representation of information whilst in transit between computer systems. 
 
The Application Layer (7) provides the communication-based service to end 
users.  The other six layers of the model exist to support and make 
possible the activities that take place at the Application Layer. 
 








We use the term 'management of secure systems' to embrace a broad set of 
activities relating to the provision of security in information 
processing and transmission systems.  In particular we include all 
aspects of secure system design, implementation and continuing 
management.  As such, security management is a subject of considerable 
depth and complexity, and we can only give a brief overview of the main 
points of the subject here.  Before considering certain aspects of the 
security management process in more detail, we briefly review the 
security life cycle of a system. 
 
The first part of this cycle (as is true for all system design 
procedures) is the requirements analysis, which should always precede any 
system design step.  Probably the most important component of any 
analysis of requirements is an assessment of threats to the system.  
Security is a meaningless term in isolation; one can only secure a system 
against a known set of threats.  Published methodologies for this 
analysis exist and are well-used in the computer security field; a well-
known example is provided by CRAM. 
 
Apart from the need to meet known threats, there are also possible 
governmental, legal and standards/interworking requirements.  These 
include such things as specific levels of protection for stored and 
communicated personal data (e.g. the Data Protection Act) and required 
levels of assurance that specified services are provided as specified. 
 
Having listed the requirements for the security system, the next step is 
the definition of security services to meet the perceived threats.  
Typical security services include:  access control (mandatory and 
discretionary), security audit, user authentication and communications 
security services such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation.  As well as these explicit services, assurance 
requirements may necessitate the use of 'pervasive security services' 
such as the use of trusted hardware. 
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Next comes the design/implementation step.  This involves the selection 
of appropriate security mechanisms to provide the necessary security 
services.  In practice this usually means the selection of appropriate 
security products.  Apart from selecting products with the appropriate 
functionality, it will often also be necessary to decide what level of 
assurance is required that the products provide the claimed services.  In 
the case of government systems this will often be defined by the relevant 
guide-lines (e.g. in the U.S. by the 'Orange Book', [3]). 
 
Finally there is the major 'continuing management' task, aspects of which 
include audit, key management and event handling (topics which are 
covered in more detail below).  This includes any necessary changes to 
the system, which will involve repeating the above cycle. 
 
It is interesting to note how many of the components of system security 
management have close parallels in other system management activities 
(such as system accounting and system configuration).  Indeed, much of 
security management can be considered as one part of the system 
management function.  However, the system management itself will often 
need to be secured, placing some security functions at a different level. 
 
 
3.2 Security domains and policies 
 
When designing a security system it is fundamentally important to define 
the scope of the system and to lay down the criteria underlying its 
operation.  The terms security domain and security policy are widely used 
to describe these concepts.  More precisely, the OSI security 
architecture, ISO 7498-2, [9], defines a security policy as 'the set of 
criteria for the provision of security services'.  A security domain is 
then simply the scope of a single security policy. 
 
In the context of the system security life-cycle defined above, the 
definition of the security policy will be in response to the initial 
requirements analysis, and will dictate both the security services to be 
provided and how they should be applied.  It will also indicate how the 
continuing security management process should function.  Most threats 
involve the notion of authorised and unauthorised behaviour, e.g. access 
to data and resources.  A generic security policy given in ISO 7498-2, 
[9] is as follows: 
Information may not be given to, accessed by, nor permitted to be 
inferred by, nor may any resource be employed by, those not appropriately 
authorised. 
The way in which authorisation is given distinguishes various types of 
policy. 
 
The OSI security architecture distinguishes between two types of security 
policy, namely identity-based security policies and rule-based security 
policies.  An identity-based policy is based on the identities and/or 
attributes of users and resources being accessed.  A rule-based policy is 
based on global rules imposed on all users; these rules typically rely on 
a comparison of the sensitivity of resources with attributes belonging to 
users wishing to access them.  There is a further distinction to be drawn 
between administration-imposed and dynamically-selectable security 




3.3 OSI security management 
 
Clause 8 of ISO 7498-2, [9], defines security management as the control 
and distribution of information for use in providing security services 
and mechanisms and reporting on security services, security mechanisms 
and the occurrence of security-related events.  Thus the distribution of 
access rights information to enable an entity to make a connection is 
part of security management. 
 
ISO 7498-2 also introduces the concept of a Security Management 
Information Base (SMIB) as a store for all security-relevant information 
needed for security management.  Conceptually, although not necessarily 
in practice, this SMIB will be part of the Management Information Base 
(MIB).  In a distributed system each end system will often need to carry 
local security information to enable it to enforce the prevailing 
security policy; thus the SMIB will often be distributed over the end 
systems.  SMIBs may take a large variety of forms, e.g. 
* tables of data; 
* files; 
* data or rules embedded within software and/or hardware. 
 
ISO 7498-2 identifies four different categories of OSI security 
management activity: 
* system security management, 
* security service management, 
* security mechanism management, and 
* security of OSI management. 
We now consider each of these aspects in turn. 
 
System security management is concerned with management of the security 
aspects of the entire system.  Typical activities include: 
* security policy management; 
* interaction with other OSI management functions (e.g. accounting, fault 
management, configuration, etc.); 
* interaction with security service management and security mechanism 
management; 
* event handling management (e.g. reporting of apparent attempts to 
violate system security, modification of thresholds used to trigger event 
reporting, etc.); 
* security audit management (see 3.4 below); 
* security recovery management (e.g. maintenance of rules used to respond 
to security violations, security administrator interactions, etc.); 
* access control policy management. 
 
Security service management is concerned with management of particular 
security services, e.g. confidentiality, authentication, etc.  Typical 
activities include: 
* selection of the security mechanism(s) to be used to provide a 
requested security service; 
* negotiation of available security mechanisms. 
 
Security mechanism management is concerned with the management of 
individual security mechanisms (which, in turn, provide security 
services).  Typical security mechanisms include: 
* key management (see 3.5 below); 
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* encipherment management (e.g. establishment of cryptographic 
parameters, cryptographic synchronisation, etc.); 
* access control management (e.g. distribution of security attributes 
including passwords, updates to access control lists, updates to 
capabilities lists, etc.); 
* data integrity management; 
* authentication management (e.g. distribution of identifying information 
such as passwords); 
* traffic padding management (maintenance of rules to be used for traffic 
padding, where such rules might include:  pre-specified data rates, 
specific lengths for messages, etc.); 
* routing control management (typically involving the definition of links 
which are secured or trusted with respect to particular criteria); 
* notarisation management (e.g. distribution of information about 
notaries, interaction with notaries, etc.). 
 
Security of OSI management is concerned with the security of the 
management functions themselves, and the security of communicated 
management information.  For example, this will include provision for the 
protection of the MIB, and for security of communications between parts 
of a distributed MIB. 
 
 
3.4 Security audit 
 
Security audit is defined in ISO 7498-2, [9], as 'an independent review 
and examination of system records and activities in order to test for 
adequacy of system controls, to ensure compliance with established policy 
and operational procedures, and to recommend any indicated changes in 
control, policy and procedures'.  This process usually makes use of a 
security audit trail, defined as 'data collected and potentially used to 
facilitate a security audit'. 
 
Security audit management is one of the system security management 
activities defined above. and includes: 
* the selection of events to be logged and/or remotely collected; 
* the enabling/disabling of audit trail logging of selected events; 
* the remote collection of selected audit reports; 
* the preparation of security audit reports. 
 
 
3.5 Key management 
 
This aspect of security management is fundamental to provision of any 
cryptography-based security services, since keys are necessary for the 
provision of any such services.  Key management is 'the generation, 
storage, secure distribution and application of keys in accordance with a 
security policy', [9]. 
 
As defined by ISO 7498-2, key management forms part of security mechanism 
management and involves: 
* generation of suitable keys at intervals commensurate with the level of 
security required; 
* determination, in accordance with access control requirements, of which 
entities should receive a copy of each key; 






We conclude this discussion of security management by briefly reviewing 
the issue of assurance.  When designing or assessing a security system 
there are two fundamental considerations; first the functionality of the 
system (i.e. what security services it provides and what types of 
security policy it can support), and second the level of assurance that 
this functionality operates correctly. 
 
As an example consider an access control system on a 'typical' 
conventional mini-computer operating system of the early 1980s.  Most 
likely it allows users to specify what type of access is permitted to 
their own files (e.g. owner only access, group access or universal 
access).  Thus this system has a certain level of access control 
functionality.  However, on many such systems of the recent past (and 
even some current systems), many loopholes exist which allow users to 
circumvent the access control mechanisms and gain unauthorised access to 
files.  These loopholes exist for many reasons, including deliberate 
design and simple error.  Thus, the claimed functionality is of low 
value, since there is no assurance as to how well the claimed 
functionality operates. 
 
This concept was taken up by the U.S. Government sponsored work on 
providing standards for computer security, which resulted in 1985 and 
1987 in the Orange and Red Books, [3], [22].  The Orange Book lists 
criteria which computer systems must satisfy in order to reach one of six 
security levels:  C1 (lowest), C2, B1, B2, B3, A1 (highest).  For each 
level there are two sets of criteria which a system must satisfy, one 
containing functional requirements and the other assurance requirements.  
The former contains things such as requirements that a B1 system should 
offer Mandatory Access Control (MAC) facilities.  The latter ranges from 
informal requirements on testing for low levels, to requiring (for A1 
systems) that there exists a formal proof that the top level 
specification meets the security policy (also formally specified). 
 
The Red Book, [22], is the U.S. National Computer Security Center 
'Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria'.  This U.S. Government standard is intended to supplement the 
previous Orange Book.  The Red Book interprets the Orange Book 
requirements for network products, and therefore enables designers of 
network products to obtain the same security level 'ratings'.  In terms 
of functionality, relatively little is required.  Indeed, obtaining Red 
Book certification does not specifically require the provision of any 
cryptographic services.  The main areas in which the Red Book requires 
special functionality are security label transfer and audit.  For 
example, for B1 certification the main functional requirement is the 
secure transfer of security labels from one machine to another. 
 
Following on from this work, various European countries have defined 
their own national standards for computer security.  In the U.K. draft 
standards exist which follow a somewhat different approach to that of the 
Orange Book.  The same level structure exists, but these levels specify 
solely assurance requirements, omitting any specific functionality.  
Whilst the U.S. standards are intended primarily for use in government 
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purchase specifications, the European work is for more general commercial 
use. 
 
It is clear that having a sensible level of assurance in claimed security 
functionality is almost more important than the functionality itself.  
Using incorrectly designed and/or poorly implemented security systems can 
be a greater risk than using completely insecure systems. 
 
 
4 OSI SECURITY ACTIVITIES 
 
The work of the main international standards committees involved in work 
on security for OSI (i.e. ISO, CCITT and ECMA) can be divided into three 
main parts: 
* First there is work on underlying security techniques, such as:  
cryptographic algorithms, modes of operation for cryptographic algorithms 
and peer entity authentication mechanisms. 
* Second there is more general work describing how these techniques may 
be used to provide security in both OSI applications and various layers 
of the OSI model, such as: the OSI security architecture, Lower and Upper 
Layer security models and various security frameworks. 
* Third there is work on specifying how security should be provided in 
specific OSI applications, as typified by the security elements in the 
1988 version of the CCITT X.400 Recommendations, [1]. 
 
We now summarise each of these three main areas of activity. 
 
 
4.1 Security techniques 
 
Within ISO, work on techniques for security, in particular on 
cryptographic techniques, has been primarily focussed within ISO/IEC 
JTC1/SC20 and its successor, SC27.  Outside ISO, other work has proceeded 
within ANSI and the NBS (in the U.S.A.).  This work can be conveniently 
divided into three areas:  algorithms (e.g. encryption functions, digital 





After the failure of attempts to standardise specific encryption 
algorithms, it was decided that ISO would change tack.  Instead, it has 
been decided to adopt the idea of an international register of 
algorithms, through which any encryption algorithm can be given a 
standardised identifier.  The draft proposal ISO DP 9979, [18], caters 
for registering proprietary algorithms, the details of which may remain 
confidential to their owners.  An international standard, ISO 8372, [10], 
specifying modes of use for an arbitrary 64-bit block cipher algorithm 
has also been produced.  A successor to this standard, in the form of a 
draft proposal, ISO DP 10116, [19], generalises this further to 
specifying modes of use for an N-bit block cipher algorithm. 
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In addition to data confidentiality, a good deal of work has also been 
done within ISO (and other standards bodies) concerning standardising 
algorithms for message authentication, integrity checking and digital 
signature.  A draft international standard now exists, ISO DIS 9797, 
[14], for a data integrity mechanism.  Two standards proposals exist 
relating to digital signature algorithms.  The first is a draft proposal, 
ISO DP 10118, [20], specifying possible methods for computing hash 
functions for digital signatures.  The second is a proposal for a 
signature algorithm for 'short' messages, ISO DP 9796, [13]. 
 
4.1.2 Peer entity authentication 
 
In parallel with the current work within ISO on algorithms, efforts have 
also been made to standardise the protocol exchanges involved in 
performing party-to-party authentication.  This has resulted in drafts 
for a multi-part standard, ISO DP 9798-n (n=1,2,3,...), [15], [16], [17]. 
 
4.1.3 Key management 
 
ISO work on key management is at an early stage of development.  Three 
draft documents exist, entitled:  Cryptographic mechanisms for key 
management: Part 1: Key management overview, Part 2: Key management using 
secret key techniques and Part 3: Key management for public key register.  
It is likely to be some time before any of these documents emerge as 
Draft Proposals, since at the moment none of them are any where near 
completion.  The general ISO work on key management will need to take 
account of earlier work in this area, in particular that undertaken for 
the financial community, where ANSI and ISO standards already exist. 
 
 
4.2 Using security mechanisms 
 
Within ISO, the questions of how and where within the OSI model security 
mechanisms are to be used falls primarily within the scope of SC21/WG1, 
together with the layer and application specific Working Groups of SC6 
and SC21.  Work in this area can be divided into three parts, namely:  
security architectures and models, security frameworks and layer specific 
standards. 
 
4.2.1 Security architectures and models 
 
To date, the main achievement in this area has been the production of the 
OSI Security Architecture, ISO 7498-2, [9], in 1988.  This document 
covers a number of important topics, including: standardised definitions 
of security terminology and security services, a guide to the 
relationship between security services and mechanisms, an indication of 
which security services are relevant to which layers of the OSI model and 
a short introduction to security management. 
 
Subsequent to the production of this standard, work has started within 
SC21 and SC6 on two security models:  a Lower Layer Model (relevant to 
OSI Layers 1-4) and an Upper Layer Model (relevant to OSI Layers 5-7).  
These models are intended as general guides to the insertion of security 
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facilities into the relevant layers of the OSI model.  Work on these two 
models is at an early stage and has not yet reached DP status. 
 
In parallel with these activities, security facilities are under 
consideration both within the ISO Open Distributed Processing group 
(SC21/WG7) and the CCITT's Distributed Applications Framework (DAF) 
activity.  Finally we briefly mention the ECMA work in this area.  ECMA 
have produced a technical report entitled Security in Open Systems - A 
Security Framework, [4] and have also produced a draft for an ECMA 
standard entitled Security in Open Systems: Data elements and service 
definitions, [5].  These documents are likely to be most significant in 
terms of the influence they have over subsequent ISO standards and CCITT 
Recommendations.  They have particular relevance to the provision of 
access control services in distributed systems. 
 
4.2.2 Security frameworks 
 
Another recently inaugurated work topic within ISO/IEC JTC1/SC21 covers 
the 'security frameworks'.  This projected six-part standard will give a 
framework for the provision of particular security services in 
distributed systems.  The six parts will cover the following topics: 
Part 1: Authentication Framework 
Part 2: Access Control Framework, 
Part 3: Non-repudiation Framework 
Part 4: Integrity Framework 
Part 5: Confidentiality Framework 
Part 6: Audit Framework 
 
In addition there will be a Part 0, giving a general introduction to the 
six security frameworks.  All these documents are at an early stage of 
development, although it is hoped to progress Parts 1 and 2 to DP status 
within the next few months. 
 
4.2.3 Layer specific standards 
 
Apart from the Upper and Lower Layer Security Models, a number of other 
drafts are in existence covering the provision of security services in 
specific layers of the OSI model.  An ISO standard exists, ISO 9160, 
[11], specifying how security should be provided in Layer 1 (Physical).  
Within IEEE 802.10, work is progressing on standardising the provision of 
security in LANs, [7], [8]; the proposed security functionality all 
resides in Layer 2 (Link).  The U.S. SDNS work (now being progressed by 
NIST) has resulted in two documents, [23], [24], specifying how security 
should be provided in Layers 3 (Network) and 4 (Transport). 
 
 
4.3 OSI application layer security 
 
We now very briefly consider the effort that has been devoted to 
providing standardised security solutions for specific OSI applications. 
 
The 1988 version of the X.500 CCITT Recommendations on Directory 
Services, [2], and their corresponding ISO draft standards, [12], include 
means to use the Directory Service to provide key management and peer-
entity authentication through storage of user public keys in the 
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directory.  The 1992 versions of these Recommendations are also expected 
to contain detailed provisions for access control to directory entries. 
 
The 1988 versions of the X.400 CCITT Recommendations, [1], include a 
variety of security features making it possible to provide a variety of 
security services for electronic mail.  For a general discussion of these 
security features see, for example, [21]. 
 
In parallel with the general growth in interest in EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange), there has also been a very rapid growth in concern 
regarding the security of EDI messages.  For those EDI messages 
transmitted using X.400 networks, use of the X.400 security features may 
be sufficient.  However, for EDI messages sent by other means, or where 
security services are required which cannot be provided using the X.400 
features, EDI may need to be enhanced to incorporate security elements.  
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